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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-3760
___________
RAUL RODRIGUEZ-GALVEZ,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A215-915-184)
Immigration Judge: Kuyomars Q. Golparvar
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 6, 2020
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 8, 2020)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Raul Rodriguez-Galvez seeks review of the final agency order authorizing his
removal from the United States. We will deny his petition for review.
I.
Rodriguez-Galvez is a citizen of Honduras. In 2018, he arrived at the United
States’ southern border to seek asylum, claiming fear of harm based on kinship ties—
local criminals stole the family farm, killed Rodriguez-Galvez’s father and brother, and
attempted to kill him as well—as well as an imputed political opinion of ‘supporting law
and order.’ An immigration judge (IJ) found Rodriguez-Galvez inadmissible under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (making inadmissible aliens who seek admission without
valid travel documents). A merits hearing on his applications for relief followed.
The IJ found that Rodriguez-Galvez’s testimony at the hearing was not credible.
The IJ determined that, even if the testimony were credible, asylum should still be
denied. While determining that past harm to Rodriguez-Galvez was persecution-level
severe, and that his asserted particular social group (“PSG”) of kinship ties was
cognizable, the IJ found no nexus between the harm and the PSG.1 The IJ also

1

The IJ’s recognition of Rodriguez-Galvez’s nuclear family as a PSG was based on
Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42 (BIA 2017), overruled in part by 27 I. & N.
Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019), which has since fallen out of favor at the agency level, see, e.g., LE-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 586 (“In the ordinary case, a family group will not [be a PSG],
because it will not have the kind of identifying characteristics that render the family
socially distinct within the society in question.”); Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316,
333 n.8 (A.G. 2018) (“There is reason to doubt that a nuclear family can comprise a
2

determined that Rodriguez-Galvez failed to advance a cognizable imputed political
opinion and that, regardless, there is no evidence of the required nexus between such an
opinion and any harm that might befall Rodriguez-Galvez if removed to Honduras. The
IJ denied withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act based on the
same reasons it denied asylum. The IJ denied relief under the Convention Against
Torture (CAT) because there was no evidence that the Honduran government would
acquiesce to any harm inflicted upon Rodriguez-Galvez.
On appeal, the BIA assumed, arguendo, that Rodriguez-Galvez’s testimony was
credible, and it affirmed the decision of the IJ. The BIA determined that both the CAT
claim and the claim based on a kinship PSG were unbriefed and thus waived.2 As for
Rodriguez-Galvez’s claim based on an imputed political opinion, the BIA agreed with the
IJ that there was no evidence of nexus and, separately, rejected the argument that the IJ
misapplied the burden of proof.
Proceeding pro se, Rodriguez-Galvez then filed this petition for review.

[PSG].”). For its part, this Court has observed that kinship can “be a defining
characteristic” of a PSG. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 556 (3d Cir. 2018).
2

The counseled BIA brief filed Rodriguez-Galvez focused almost exclusively on the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination. It does not appear that Rodriguez-Galvez has filed a
motion to reopen, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Matter of
Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). Nor has he briefed such a claim here.
3

II.
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
But we may do so only to the extent that “the alien has exhausted all administrative
remedies available to the alien as of right[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Under § 1252(d)(1),
an alien is required “to raise or exhaust his or her remedies as to each claim or ground for
relief [before the BIA] if he or she is to preserve the right of judicial review of that
claim.” Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal
quotations omitted). That exhaustion requirement is dispositive here.
We recognize that substantial time was put into crafting Rodriguez-Galvez’s
opening brief. However, due to the narrowly focused appellate briefing by RodriguezGalvez’s counsel before the BIA, see AR 5-12, all but one of the issues raised here is
unexhausted and thus unreviewable.3
The one issue presented in the opening brief that was properly exhausted before
the BIA is Rodriguez-Galvez’s challenge to the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.
But we are reviewing the BIA’s decision, and consider the IJ’s decision only insofar as
the BIA deferred to it. See Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012). For
that reason, arguments about the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, see Pet’r Br. at

3

Rodriguez-Galvez does not challenge the BIA’s ruling that issues concerning the
kinship PSG and CAT claims were waived. We discern no basis to disturb the BIA’s
waiver ruling. Cf. Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2017), as
amended (Sept. 25, 2017).
4

16, inclusive of whether medical evidence corroborated testimony about RodriguezGalvez’s gunshot wound, see id. at 19, are inapt; the BIA assumed on appeal that the
testimony was credible, and we would do the same. See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d
246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).
Finally, we observe that we could have considered arguments concerning
Rodriguez-Galvez’s claim of persecution on account of an allegedly imputed political
opinion. But no such arguments are presented, let alone developed, in the opening brief,
so they are waived. See In re: Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 237
(3d Cir. 2017).
Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, Rodriguez-Galvez’s petition for
review will be denied.
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